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Abstract 
 
This article analyzes the impact of conciliatory initiatives on conflict resolution in two- 
party bargaining. It specifically develops and tests a theory of unilateral initiatives derived from 
Osgood's (1962) notion of Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension Reduction (GRIT). 
The major propositions of the theory indicate that, given a pattern of mutual resistance or 
hostility, unilateral initiatives and tit-for-tat retaliation in response to punitive action will produce 
more conciliation and less hostility by an opponent. To test the theory, a bargaining setting was 
created in a laboratory experiment in which parties exchanged offers and counteroffers on an 
issue across a number of rounds while also having the option to engage in punitive action against 
one another. The results indicated that (1) unilateral initiatives produced more concession 
making and less hostility than a reciprocity strategy, and (2) tit-for-tat retaliation heightened 
hostility initially but reduced it over time. The article suggests some general, abstract conditions 
under which two parties in conflict can produce conciliation and reach agreements without the 
intervention of third parties. 
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This article addresses the following question: Given a social structure that produces 
conflict behavior, how can one party break a pattern of conflict and generate mutual 
conciliation? We assume a structure that pits two groups against one another and an effort by 
each group to deal with the conflict via explicit bargaining, i.e., through an explicit exchange of 
offers and counteroffers. Entering explicit bargaining involves a decision by parties to consider, 
if not actively seek, a compromise solution to the conflict (Bacharach & Lawler 1980; Chertkoff 
& Esser 1976; Schelling 1960). Examples include contract negotiations between labor and 
management, SALT negotiations of the Soviet Union and United States, plea bargaining in the 
criminal justice system, as well as the development of a divorce settlement by lawyers 
representing each side.1 
The onset of explicit bargaining does not necessarily cease mutually damaging action 
(e.g., wars, strikes, protests) or even lead to much compromise. The bargaining setting often 
becomes simply another context within which the conflict is enacted and within which actors 
seek to gain advantage rather than produce mutual conciliation. As a result, it is not unusual for 
bargaining to fail outright or to produce conflict resolution only after lengthy periods of impasse 
from which parties suffer high costs. There are at least two general obstacles to conciliation that 
make conflict resolution problematic, even after parties reach the bargaining table. 
First, social conflict typically has a social-structural foundation. Each bargainer (or the 
group each represents) occupies a structural position in a larger system, a position with interests 
that diverge from those associated with the structural position of the opponent. Parties to 
bargaining interpret, translate, or otherwise make concrete the interests embedded in their 
structural positions (see Lawler n.d.) and, in the process, they may exacerbate the structurally 
based conflict. Parties have an incentive to manage impressions carefully, and their interests 
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shape the perceptions upon which they each make tactical decisions. When their interests have a 
structural foundation, the stakes are higher and the differences between parties' interpretations of 
the situation and between their preferences are particularly difficult to bridge. 
A second, related obstacle is that even if both parties adopt a goal of mutual conciliation, 
there is no assurance that they can convince each other of this fact. Consequently, conflict may 
continue unabated despite such compatible goals. To resolve conflict, some degree of trust is 
necessary, according to much social psychological evidence (Pruitt 1981); yet trust is difficult to 
develop, because early periods of explicit bargaining often contain patterns of mutual resistance 
or hostility that reflect posturing, suspicion, and ultimately the structural position of the parties. 
Thus, when the conflict has a structural foundation and posturing occurs early in the bargaining, 
reaching an agreement expeditiously or without the intervention of third parties (e.g., allies, 
mediators, arbitrators) becomes highly problematic. 
The primary purpose of this article is to examine the success of a particular bargaining 
tactic — unilateral initiatives — at overcoming the obstacles to conciliation noted above. Our 
focus is informed by a tactical approach to the bargaining process, which emphasizes the moves 
and countermoves of parties, conceptualizes such moves as tactics of influence, and analyzes 
tactics as efforts to manipulate an opponent (see Bacharach & Lawler 1981; Lawler & Bacharach 
1987; Lawler, Ford & Blegen 1988). In brief, a tactic is a move or set of moves that can be 
directed at a variety of specific objectives, e.g., testing the opponent's resolve, gaining 
information about the opponent, issuing a warning, fostering a particular definition of an issue, 
presenting a particular image or identity, punishing the opponent. However, most tactics fall into 
two general classes (Pruitt 1981): hostile and conciliatory. Unilateral initiatives, in our theory, 
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are a form of conciliatory tactic suggested by Osgood's (1962) analysis of Graduated and 
Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension Reduction (GRIT). 
Osgood (1962) originally proposed GRIT as a conceptual framework for ending the arms 
race between the United States and the Soviet Union. The fundamental premise is as follows: If 
graduated, reciprocal negative action produced the arms buildup, then graduated, reciprocal 
positive action is the pathway to reducing it. The gears of the escalator need only be shifted to 
reverse. The primary tactic for shifting the gears involves a series of unilateral initiatives. 
Examples of initiatives are Anwar Sadat's trip to Israel in 1978 and John F. Kennedy's unilateral 
cessation of above-ground nuclear testing in 1962 (see Etzioni 1967). However, the ideas 
underlying GRIT need not be limited to international conflicts or to the particular ones of 
concern to Osgood. From the conceptual and empirical literature in this tradition, one can 
extrapolate a set of parsimonious theoretical principles indicating when parties might resolve 
conflict themselves, without reliance on mediators and arbitrators. These principles — 
composing a theory of unilateral initiatives — are explicated and tested experimentally in the 
following pages. 
 
Background of the Theory 
 
From early social psychological work on matrix games through the recent simulation 
work of Axelrod (1984), the standard answer to the question of how parties can produce 
conciliation by an opponent has been reciprocity (e.g., Deutsch et al. 1967; Oskamp 1971; 
Wrightsman, O'Conner & Baker 1972; Komorita & Esser 1975). Most of the research has been 
conducted in iterative prisoner's dilemma games in which reciprocity is defined as a matching 
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(i.e., tit- for-tat) strategy whereby an actor makes the same choice (cooperative vs. competitive) 
as the opponent did on the immediately preceding trial. Experimental research demonstrates that 
a matching strategy generally produces more cooperation than most (if not all) other viable 
strategies (e.g., Oskamp 1971; Wrightsman, O'Conner & Baker 1972), and computer simulations 
by Axelrod (1984) have shown that this strategy is the best among a very large set of possibilities 
identified by bargaining scholars. In sum, reciprocity seems to be a simple and straightforward 
solution to the strategic dilemma faced by a party wishing to produce mutual conciliation. 
However, there are several unresolved theoretical issues in the literature on reciprocity 
(see Deutsch 1973; Deutsch et al. 1967; Gouldner 1960; Youngs 1986). One is an issue 
addressed by Osgood (1962), i.e., how to develop reciprocal positive action if a pattern of mutual 
resistance or hostility already has been established. Tit-for-tat reciprocity tends to create and 
maintain a "lock-in" of competition or hostility once defection occurs (Axelrod 1984), and, 
consistent with the implications of Osgood (1962), Patchen (1987) argues that unilateral 
initiatives represent the most effective tactic for breaking a lock-in of mutual competition. 
Conciliatory actions that are unilateral pose a difficult impression management problem 
for a party considering such a tactic. This problem is reflected in several studies of explicit 
bargaining, which indicate that large concessions or concession patterns that create an image of 
softness actually reduce the concession making of an opponent (Benton, Kelley & Liebling 1972; 
Komorita & Brenner 1968; Yukl 1974). The classic explanation for such findings is that an 
image of softness raises the opponent's aspiration level, which, in turn, reduces the opponent's 
inclination to yield (Siegel & Fouraker 1960). From this perspective, unilateral initiatives may 
convey weakness and produce exploitation rather than conciliation by the opponent. The tangible 
and intangible costs of unilateral initiatives that fail can be substantial. 
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To deal with the potential of exploitation, Osgood (1962) stresses that the initiatives 
should be small and symbolic but substantial enough to foster an atmosphere of trust. Taking the 
practical purposes of the GRIT notion to heart, Lindskold (1978) proposes ten specific guidelines 
for making unilateral initiatives effective: (1) express a sincere desire to reduce tension; (2) 
publicly announce each conciliatory initiative; (3) carry out each initiative on schedule; (4) 
invite, but do not demand, reciprocation; (5) continue conciliatory initiatives even without 
reciprocation; (6) make the initiative unambiguous and susceptible to verification; (7) retain your 
retaliatory capability; (8) respond tit for tat to exploitation; (9) match reciprocal concessions by 
the other; and (10) diversify the initiatives. Action in accord with these guidelines ostensibly will 
restore some of the trust lost in a pattern of mutual hostility or impasse. 
Several studies support the notion that conciliatory initiatives of one sort or another elicit 
more cooperation in prisoner's dilemma or bilateral monopoly games than do strict matching or 
reciprocity strategies (e.g., Hamner 1974; Lawler & MacMurray 1980; Lindskold 1979; 
Lindskold & Aronoff 1980; Lindskold & Collins 1978; Lindskold & Finch 1981; Patchen 1988). 
However, assuming a buildup of hostility as an initial condition, some guidelines seem more 
important than others, and it is not clear what basic theoretical principles are at work here. 
Separation of the most fundamental ones from those less fundamental will facilitate the 
development of some simple and parsimonious theoretical principles. 
In this article, we develop two central, or core, themes of the conceptual and research 
literature on GRIT: the role of unilateral initiatives (e.g., guidelines 2-6 and 9-10) and tit-for-tat 
retaliation (e.g., guidelines 7 and 8). We assume that the ultimate goal of conflict resolution is 
contingent on parties' achievement of two intermediate goals: (1) an increase in the opponent's 
concessions (which the party can then reciprocate), and (2) a decrease in the opponent's use of 
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punitive tactics. From this perspective, unilateral initiatives and retaliation tactics are the central 
independent variables, and concession and punitive behavior are distinct dependent variables. 
The next section specifies the fundamental theoretical connections among these independent and 
dependent variables. 
 
A Theory of Unilateral Initiatives 
 
One problem with the original formulation of Osgood (1962) and related work is a lack 
of clarity on what sort of context or situation is at issue. The scope conditions of Osgood's (1962) 
incipient theory are unspecified, resulting, for example, in ambiguity about whether the GRIT 
notion is intended to apply equally to efforts at reaching the bargaining table and to efforts at 
concluding an agreement once the bargaining table has been reached. In conjunction with a lack 
of explicitness about the main predictions, insufficient specification of the intended scope 
conditions has contributed to substantial variation in how the theory of unilateral initiatives has 
been interpreted, applied, and tested (e.g., Hamner 1974; Lindskold & Finch 1981; Patchen 
1988; Pilisuk 1984;). As a first step, we offer herein a simple theoretical formulation with 
delimited scope conditions, using the existing literature on GRIT heuristically rather than 
literally. The scope conditions and core propositions are discussed, in turn, below. 
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SCOPE CONDITIONS 
 
The theoretical formulation is designed to apply to conflict situations that encompass the 
following five conditions. 
 
Two Parties Are Engaged in Explicit Bargaining 
 
The parties have consented to bargain, and so unilateral initiatives are not designed to 
produce bargaining but to bring it to a successful conclusion, presumably without the direct aid 
or interference of third parties (e.g., allies, mediators, arbitrators). Given the properties of 
explicit bargaining defined earlier (e.g., mutual acknowledgement of the bargaining, an issue 
with a range of possible solutions, an exchange of offers and counteroffers), a prisoner's dilemma 
does not adequately capture the context and thus is not an appropriate laboratory setting for 
testing this formulation. This is an important point, because nearly all research on the GRIT 
notion has been conducted in iterative prisoner's dilemma games.2 
Similar to most social psychological work on explicit bargaining, the theory of unilateral 
initiatives assumes that parties begin bargaining with an individualistic orientation, i.e., 
attempting to maximize their own gain without regard to that of others. Because explicit 
bargaining is mixed-motive, however, there is likely to be some oscillation by actors on the 
meaning of maximization — specifically, on whether it suggests more concretely a goal of 
gaining an advantage over the opponent or a goal of mutual conciliation. 
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Each Party Lacks (and Believes the Other Lacks) Knowledge of the Other's Payoff Across 
Possible Solution Points 
 
This assumption is adopted in most social psychological research on bargaining, and it 
reflects an effort to incorporate or take into account some ambiguity typical of real-world 
bargaining. Incomplete information on payoffs accentuates the importance of the impression-
management aspect of concession behavior. 
 
Each Party Has a Coercive Capability (i.e., the Ability to Damage Outcomes Already Possessed 
by the Opponent) and, Therefore, the Option of Using Damage Tactics 
 
In conjunction with the first scope condition, this means that positive (concession) and 
negative (punitive) actions are analytically and empirically separable, a condition seemingly 
critical to Osgood's (1962) original formulation but frequently neglected in subsequent research 
using the prisoner's dilemma.3 For initial purposes, the theory of unilateral initiatives assumes 
that parties have equal coercive power capabilities and that they have knowledge of each other's 
coercive capabilities. 
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The Setting Is a Bilateral Monopoly, Meaning That Parties Cannot "Leave the Field" 
 
In this context, parties are committed to bargaining interaction for a fixed period, which, 
theoretically, is part of the "consent to bargain." Parties do not necessarily have to yield or make 
concessions, but their communication of proposals or offers must continue for a fixed period of 
time. 
 
A Pattern of Mutual Resistance and Hostility Is Established in the Early Phase of Explicit 
Bargaining 
 
This condition broadens the only clear scope condition — an impasse — in Osgood's 
(1962) original discussion and is consistent with most research on GRIT (see Hamner 1974; 
Lindskold 1978). In explicit bargaining, a pattern or history of mutual resistance should foster 
mutual impressions of firmness, which prevent a unilateral initiative (all other things being 
equal) from being perceived as a sign of weakness and thereby avert exploitation (see relevant 
reviews in Chertkoff & Esser 1976; Rubin & Brown 1975; Pruitt 1981). The initial pattern of 
mutual hostility in the context of a consent to bargain essentially establishes conditions making 
unilateral initiatives potentially effective, though parties may have difficulty recognizing this 
potential. 
While the scope conditions suggest a more limited theory of unilateral initiatives than 
implied by Osgood (1962) and Lindskold (1978), the above context corresponds with important 
features of many interpersonal, labor- management, interorganizational, and international 
negotiation situations where parties have taken an initial step toward conflict resolution by 
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initiating explicit bargaining. Our theoretical strategy is to begin with these more limited, or 
narrow, set of conditions. 
 
CORE PROPOSITIONS 
 
The core propositions of the formulation are diagrammed in Figure 1. Unilateral 
initiatives refer to a series of small concessions undertaken independent of the opponent's 
response. The retaliation tactic refers to a tit-for-tat response (by the user of unilateral 
initiatives) to punitive action by the opponent. Trust is a hypothetical construct defined as a 
dispositional attribution forming the basis for an expectation of cooperation.4 Concessions refer 
to the magnitude of yielding by the opponent; punitive tactics refer to the frequency of damaging 
action by the opponent; and agreement, of course, refers to whether or not the bargainers actually 
reach a solution to the issue at hand. 
The fundamental claims, based on Figure 1 and given the scope conditions, are as 
follows: 
 
Proposition 1: If party A engages in a series of unilateral initiatives, party B's concession making 
will increase and its use of punitive tactics will decrease. 
Proposition 2: If party A adopts a retaliation tactic in response to punitive action, party B's 
concession making will increase and its use of punitive tactics will decrease. 
 
For unilateral initiatives (proposition 1), a single intervening mechanism — attributions 
of trust — is the primary explanation found in the GRIT literature (Osgood 1962; Lindskold 
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1978). Initiatives, which are unilateral and lack an explicit expectation of reciprocity, ostensibly 
foster an image of sincerity, reliability, and reasonableness, which in turn produces larger 
concessions and fewer punitive tactics by the opponent. A dispositional attribution of 
trustworthiness enhances the confidence of the target that concessions will be reciprocated. In the 
case of retaliation (proposition 2), a tit-for-tat response to punitive action makes such action 
costly to the opponent and also helps to ensure that unilateral initiatives do not communicate 
excessive softness or vulnerability. A complex interplay of intervening mechanisms, involving 
both the experience of cost and the creation of an image of firmness, should operate in the case 
of the retaliation tactic. Trust is included in the theoretical model at this point because of its 
prominence in the related literature (see Blalock 1989; Lindskold 1978; Pruitt 1981) and because 
of Axelrod's (1984) suggestion that trust is not necessary to account for the development of tacit 
bargains in an iterative prisoner's dilemma. 
 
 
Insert Figure 1 Here 
 
 
The two propositions above will be tested in a laboratory context, using a simulated actor 
(A) in order to instantiate the specified behavior. To test the first proposition, a unilateral 
initiatives condition will be compared with a reciprocity (no-initiatives) control condition; and to 
test the second proposition, a pattern of retaliation will be compared with a no-retaliation 
condition. 
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Methods 
 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
A bargaining relationship between a subject and a programmed other was created in a 
laboratory setting. The setting was a modified bilateral monopoly similar to that used in some 
recent work on coercive capability in conflict (see Lawler & Bacharach 1987; Lawler, Ford & 
Blegen 1988). A 2 × 2, completely randomized factorial design manipulated the unilateral 
initiatives (present vs. control) and retaliation behavior (present vs. control) of the programmed 
other. Eighty subjects (all male) were assigned randomly to one of the four cells (twenty per 
cell).5 
 
PROCEDURES 
 
Subjects were scheduled in groups of two to four. When they arrived at the laboratory, 
the experimenter led them to a cubicle in one of several rooms. Each cubicle was equipped with 
a computer terminal on which the subjects would read instructions for the study, and the 
experimenter informed them that they would be bargaining with a participant in another room. 
The instructions gave a detailed explanation of the setting and bargaining procedures. To 
give the conflict a minimal intergroup character, subjects were placed in the role of representing 
a constituency. Specifically, subjects represented a group, called Beta, negotiating with a group, 
called Alpha. The bargaining issue was an abstract set of agreement levels (numbered 11-49), 
each with profit (points) attached to it. The issue could represent the price of a product in a 
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buyer-seller situation, a wage increase in a labor-management context, or a trade agreement 
between nations (for similar procedures, see Bacharach & Lawler 1981; Lawler & Bacharach 
1987; Lawler, Ford & Blegen 1988). 
A profit list showed subjects the number of points they would win at each agreement 
level. The maximum number of points that each bargainer could receive from the bargaining was 
300, and subjects received more points the closer the agreement was to level 11. The instructions 
did not provide any concrete information on Alpha's profit, except to note that Alpha preferred 
higher agreement levels. Instructions indicated further that there had been preliminary 
negotiations in which Alpha had offered 49 and Beta had offered 11. This served to justify the 
ends of the issue continuum. The instructions indicated that subjects should attempt to maximize 
their own points regardless of the other's profit. 
Bargainers had a second source of profit beyond the issue under negotiation, specifically, 
an account worth 300 points. This account was equal in value to the outcomes at stake in the 
bargaining and symbolized the current, existing resources under the control of or already 
possessed by a bargainer. Such resources were not under direct negotiation, but each bargainer 
could use damage tactics (i.e., fines) to reduce the opponent's account. This coercive power 
capability was high and equal across experimental conditions, i.e., each had the capacity to 
reduce the other's account to zero through the repetitive use of fines. 
The maximum number of bargaining rounds was twenty. Each round consisted of the 
following sequence: (1) an offer by Alpha (the programmed other), (2) an offer by Beta (the 
subject), (3) a standardized message from Alpha, and (4) a choice among standardized message 
options by the subject. Offers and messages were entered on the computer terminal and 
transmitted back and forth by the computer. When making an offer, subjects could repeat their 
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last offer, accept the last offer of the programmed other, or make a concession. Subjects could 
not retract concessions or move backward to a previous position on die issue continuum. 
Turning to the punitive options, subjects could send a "fine," a "warning," or "no 
message." A fine was a damage tactic that reduced the other's account by 30 points, and each 
side was allowed a maximum of 10 fines (damage tactics). A warning was a threat to use a fine 
in the future, and there was no limit on the number of warnings. The no-message option was 
designed to ensure subjects understood that a fine or warning was not necessary and also to keep 
the sequence of steps in each round constant. Throughout the bargaining, the computer terminal 
displayed all the offers and messages of each bargainer. 
Agreements could occur in one of two ways: the subject could at any time produce 
conflict resolution by agreeing to the last offer of the programmed other, or the subject could 
concede to the point that the program called for an offer equal to or lower than the preceding 
offer of the subject (recall that the subject preferred lower offers on the issue continuum). In both 
cases, the subject's offer produced the agreement. 
The bargaining ceased if there was no agreement after twenty rounds. At this point, the 
computer relayed point winnings to subjects, summing the points from the bargaining (which 
was zero if there was no agreement) and those remaining in the account. Following completion 
of the questionnaire, subjects were debriefed about the fictitious other and paid a set amount 
greater than their point winnings would have indicated. 
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ESTABLISHING A PATTERN OF MUTUAL RESISTANCE 
 
To implement a key scope condition of the theory of unilateral initiatives, the first five 
rounds contained a standard, uniform sequence of resistance and hostility by the programmed 
other. The specific action of the programmed other was as follows: (1) offers of 49 on each of 
the first five rounds, i.e., no concessions, and (2) damage tactics (fines) on the first and fifth 
round and a threat tactic (warning) on the third and fourth rounds. Based on previous work 
(Lawler & MacMurray 1980) and extensive pretesting, we expected the subject's response to 
indicate a pattern of mutual resistance or hostility by the end of the fifth round. 
The project considered the scope condition to be met if during the first five rounds the 
subject (1) repeated an offer (i.e., made no concession) three consecutive times, (2) used damage 
tactics (fines) twice and conceded three or fewer units on the issue continuum, or (3) used more 
damage tactics than the programmed other. Eleven subjects failed to meet these conditions and 
were excluded. 
 
EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATIONS 
 
Unilateral initiatives and retaliation behavior by the programmed other created the 
experimental manipulations. The programmed other either initiated a series of unilateral 
concessions or did not initiate concessions and either retaliated in response to the subject's fines 
or did not retaliate. The manipulations were in force from the sixth to the tenth round of the 
bargaining. 
Resolving Conflict Through Explicit Bargaining        18 
 
In the initiatives condition, the programmed other (after sticking at 49 for the first five 
rounds) initiated concessions during rounds 6-10 as follows: 48,47,45, 42, and 39, respectively. 
In the no-initiative (reciprocity) control condition, the programmed other did not initiate any 
concessions but fully reciprocated any concessions made by the subject during this period. After 
the tenth round (and across experimental conditions), the programmed other reciprocated the 
magnitude of each concession in the offer immediately following the subjects. Reciprocation 
after the series of unilateral initiatives is the pattern most consistent with the original GRIT 
formulation. 
In the retaliation condition, whenever the subject used a damage tactic (fine), the 
programmed other used a damage tactic on the next round. In the no-retaliation control 
condition, damage tactics by the subject were not reciprocated and so were not used at all by the 
programmed other after the first five rounds. The retaliation-versus-control manipulation was in 
force from round 6 to the conclusion of the bargaining. Across conditions, warnings by the 
programmed other did not occur from round 6 on. 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
The primary dependent variables suggested by the theory of unilateral initiatives are 
damage tactics (fines) and concession levels (magnitude). The analysis distinguishes the early 
response to the experimental manipulations (during rounds 6-10) from the later, or subsequent, 
response (rounds 11-20). Thus, the number of fines sent by subjects in the early phase (rounds 6-
10) and the number sent in the later phase (rounds 11-20) are analyzed, as is the magnitude of the 
subject's concession during these phases of the bargaining (i.e., offer 10 minus offer 6 and the 
Resolving Conflict Through Explicit Bargaining        19 
 
last offer minus offer 10). Conflict resolution refers to whether or not an agreement was reached 
by the end of the twentieth bargaining round. 
Other analyses examine information from a postexperiment questionnaire, administered 
by the computer program at the end of the bargaining. This questionnaire included three items 
that measured the subject's perceptions of how the programmed other changed over the session, 
i.e., to what extent the other became more or less trustworthy, more or less reasonable, and more 
or less inclined to use damage tactics. Ttoo other items asked about the predictability of the 
programmed other's behavior as the session progressed, i.e., to what extent the programmed 
other's concession behavior became more or less predictable and to what extent the message 
behavior became more or less predictable. Each of the five questions contained the same seven-
point response format, with labels defining the points on the continuum. Other items with the 
same format served as a check on the manipulations. 
 
Results 
 
The success of the manipulations was indicated by postexperiment questionnaire items 
asking subjects, "To what extent did the other bargainer initiate offers?" and "To what extent did 
the other bargainer reciprocate your fines?" Consistent with our intent, subjects perceived more 
initiation in the initiatives condition than in the reciprocity control condition [𝐹𝐹(1,79) ∗24.52,𝑝𝑝 < .001] and more reciprocation of fine messages in the retaliation condition than in the 
noretaliation control condition [𝐹𝐹(1,79) = 67.36,𝑝𝑝 < .001]. 
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Insert Table 1 Here 
 
 
CONCESSION MAGNITUDE 
 
The mean magnitude of concessions by experimented conditions can be found in Table 1 (rows 1 
and 2). 
 
Early Phase (Rounds 6-10) 
 
Consistent with the theory of unilateral initiatives, an analysis of variance for the early 
phase showed that the immediate response to unilateral initiatives was to concede significantly 
more [2.425,𝐹𝐹(1,79) = 25.24,𝑝𝑝 < .0001, 𝑀𝑀′𝑠𝑠 = 5.88 vs. 2.42] than in the reciprocity control 
condition. The retaliation tactic did not affect concession making [𝐹𝐹(1,79) = 2.12,𝑝𝑝 < .15, 
𝑀𝑀′𝑠𝑠 = 3.65 (no retaliation) vs. 4.65 (retaliation)], and the interaction of initiatives and 
retaliation was not significant [𝐹𝐹(1,79) = 1.19, n.s.]. Thus, the results for the early response to 
unilateral initiatives support the theory, and those for retaliation do not. 
 
Later Phase (Rounds 11-20) 
 
Across early and later phases, the effect of unilateral initiatives on total concession is 
significant and in the right direction [𝐹𝐹(1,79) = 5.62,𝑝𝑝 < .025]. However, the analysis for 
concession magnitude during the subsequent or later phase does not reveal significant effects 
(𝐹𝐹′𝑠𝑠 < 𝑙𝑙). One feasible reason for this result is that as explicit bargaining proceeds toward some 
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fixed deadline (in this case, twenty rounds), the pressures to concede are contingent in part on 
how much an actor has yielded earlier. Larger concessions earlier in the bargaining can result in 
smaller concessions later in the bargaining and vice versa, assuming a fixed maximum of 
yielding. These are often termed "end effects," and they occur in both real world and laboratory 
contexts. A by-blocks (i.e., repeated-measures) analysis of variance was conducted to pursue this 
issue. 
 
By-Block Analysis 
 
For this analysis, the last fifteen rounds of bargaining were divided into three blocks of 
five rounds each. To deal with cases where the bargaining ended with agreement in less than 
twenty rounds, the average concession per round was calculated for each block, and only cases 
that went at least eighteen rounds were included in the analysis. This criterion resulted in the loss 
of eight cases distributed fairly evenly across conditions. 
 
 
Insert Figure 2 Here 
 
 
The resulting 2 × 2 × 3 analysis, with block as a repeated measure, revealed one effect 
involving the block variable — an interaction of unilateral initiatives and block [𝐹𝐹(2,136) =6.89,𝑝𝑝 < .001]. The pattern of the interaction (see Figure 2) is compatible with the end effects 
interpretation. Unilateral initiatives continued to have a positive effect on concessions during the 
first five rounds (block 2) after the initiatives phase was completed, and subjects in the 
reciprocity-only (i.e., no-initiatives) condition, having yielded little during the first two blocks, 
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appear to have attempted to catch up as the deadline approached. The most critical point is that 
the predicted positive impact of unilateral initiatives continued beyond the time when the 
initiatives were in force. Further corroboration of this point is yielded by a regression analysis, 
which will be reported later. 
 
DAMAGE TACTICS (FINES) 
 
Early Phase (Rounds 6-10) 
 
Analysis of the mean frequency of fines (see Table 1, row 3) during the early phase 
revealed two significant findings: (1) unilateral initiatives produced fewer damage tactics by 
subjects than the reciprocity (no-initiatives) control [𝐹𝐹(1,79) =  10.31, 𝑝𝑝 < .01, 𝑀𝑀′𝑠𝑠 = .80 vs. 1.75], and (2) the immediate impact of the retaliation tactic was to increase the use of damage 
tactics by subjects [𝐹𝐹(1,79) = 15.11,𝑝𝑝 < .001, 𝑀𝑀′𝑠𝑠 = 1.850 vs. .700]. The results for 
unilateral initiatives are consistent with the theory under discussion, whereas those for retaliation 
are contrary to it. 
 
 
Insert Figure 3 Here 
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Later Phase (Rounds 11-20) 
 
The only significant finding for the frequency of damage tactics in the later phase is a 
main effect for unilateral initiatives. Fewer damage tactics were used when the programmed 
other had previously undertaken a series of unilateral concession initiatives [𝐹𝐹(1,79) =13.36,𝑝𝑝 < .001, 𝑀𝑀’𝑠𝑠 = 1.50 vs. 3.03]. Thus, combining the results for early and later phases, 
there is strong support for the negative effect of unilateral initiatives on punitive action, when 
compared to a reciprocity-only control condition.6 
The effects of retaliation on the use of damage tactics are obviously more complex than 
the impact of unilateral initiatives. The main effect for retaliation is not statistically significant 
for the later phase [𝐹𝐹(1,79) = 1.58, n.s., 𝑀𝑀’𝑠𝑠 = 2.00 vs. 2.52], and the pattern is actually the 
opposite of that observed for the early phase (see Table 1). A by-block analysis, identical in form 
to that for concession magnitude, was conducted to ferret out the apparent differences across 
time. 
 
By-Block Analysis 
 
The 2 × 2 × 3 analysis of variance, with block as a repeated measure, revealed a 
significant retaliation by block interaction [𝐹𝐹(2,136) = 7.13, 𝑝𝑝 < .001]. When the programmed 
other retaliated consistently, the use of damage tactics decreased over time, whereas a lack of 
retaliation resulted in an increase of such tactics. This finding is actually consistent with the 
theory of unilateral initiatives if parties need more than five rounds to fully discern the 
retaliation-versus-no- retaliation pattern in the programmed other's behavior. We conclude that 
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over time the effect predicted by the theory tends to occur in the retaliation condition. It is also 
interesting that a party who adopts a policy of nonretaliation faces increasing hostility over time. 
 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
 
A log-linear analysis of the proportion of agreements for each experimental condition 
revealed a main effect for unilateral initiatives in the predicted direction (𝑥𝑥 < 9.58,𝑝𝑝 < .01) as 
well as an interaction effect (𝑥𝑥 = 4.84, 𝑝𝑝 < .05). The highest rate (i.e., 75%) of conflict 
resolution occurred when the programmed other combined unilateral initiatives with a policy of 
tit-for-tat retaliation. The rate of agreement was well below 50% in all other conditions (see 
Table 1). These findings support the interactive effects of retaliation and unilateral initiatives on 
conflict resolution suggested in some related literature (Patchen 1987). 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE DATA 
 
The five items noted earlier were factor analyzed using a varimax rotation with a limit of 
two factors. Conceptually, two items reflect the trust variable (i.e., the perceived trustworthiness 
and perceived reasonableness of the programmed other), and two reflect the perceived 
predictability of the programmed other's behavior. The fifth item, the perceived change in the 
other's inclination to fine, does not fit either the trust or predictability rubric. Consistent with 
such reasoning, the factor analysis revealed separate factors for trust and predictability (see Table 
2).7 The Cronbach alpha for the trust index was .65, but for predictability it was only .22. 
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An analysis of variance was conducted for the two-item index of trust (summing the raw 
scores). Consistent with the theory of unilateral initiatives, perceived trust was greater in the 
initiatives than in the reciprocity control [𝐹𝐹(1,79) = 16.60,𝑝𝑝 < .001], and neither the retaliation 
main effect nor the initiatives- by-retaliation interaction was statistically significant (𝐹𝐹′𝑠𝑠 < 1). 
The perceived predictability of the programmed other's behavior does not have theoretical 
importance but could suggest whether we inadvertently created differing levels of predictability 
across experimental conditions. However, the results for the two-item index and each item 
separately (given the low reliability of the index) did not reveal significant effects and thereby 
indicate no such differences (𝐹𝐹′𝑠𝑠 < 1). 
 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
A regression analysis of concession and damage behavior in the later phase (rounds 11-
20) was designed to test the mediating effects of trust for unilateral initiatives. Such a test must 
be considered provisional, since trust was measured on the postexperiment questionnaire. 
However, since the questionnaire items were retrospective, a regression analysis is still 
informative. 
Table 3 contains the standardized regression coefficients from three regression equations 
for concession magnitude and the frequency of damage tactics. The first equation includes only 
the two manipulated variables (plus the interaction); trust is added to the second equation; and 
the third equation controls for all previous concession and damage behavior (i.e., concession 
magnitude and the frequency of fines summed across all prior bargaining phases, including the 
first five rounds). 
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Insert Table 2 Here 
 
 
The regression results support several points. First, in accord with the theory of unilateral 
initiatives, higher levels of trust enhanced concession making by subjects (𝛽𝛽 = .386, 𝑝𝑝 < .01) 
while also reducing their use of damage tactics (𝛽𝛽 = −.440,𝑝𝑝 < .001). Second, trust mediated 
the impact of unilateral initiatives on damage tactics. The mediation was virtually complete 
(equation 3) when concession and damage behavior in the first half of the experiment was 
controlled (indirect effect=.227). Third, some evidence of a suppressor effect supports our earlier 
suggestion of end effects. There was virtually no effect for initiatives (𝛽𝛽 = −.043) without trust 
and other controls in the equation (equation 4); however, with the inclusion of these controls 
(equation 6), the coefficient for the direct effect of initiatives increased considerably (𝛽𝛽 =
−.290), though it remained nonsignificant statistically (𝑝𝑝 <. 11). The most telling result is that 
the sign of the direct effect of initiatives on concession magnitude was negative, and the sign of 
the indirect effect through trust was positive. 
 
 
Insert Table 3 Here 
 
 
More specifically, the positive indirect effect reflects a large, positive impact of 
initiatives on trust (𝛽𝛽 = .515,𝑝𝑝 < .001), which, when combined with the impact of trust on 
concessions (𝛽𝛽 = .386), yields a positive indirect effect of reasonable size (.199). This indirect 
effect indicates that through trust, unilateral initiatives have the predicted effect on concession 
making. The trend toward a negative direct effect, on the other hand, is consistent with the fact 
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that the immediate positive impact of initiatives during rounds 6-10 reduces the potential 
yielding that can occur later in the bargaining. These direct and indirect coefficients essentially 
distinguish the end effects from effects supportive of the theory. Overall, the regression analysis 
supports the mediating effect of trust and suggests that the predicted impact of unilateral 
initiatives on concession behavior is contingent on such mediation. 
 
Summary and Discussion 
 
The theoretical formulation presented above, developed inferentially from the GRIT 
notion (Osgood 1962), can be construed as an effort to understand when and how two actors 
might resolve conflict without the intervention of third parties, such as mediators and arbitrators. 
To the degree that actors "freely" and consensually develop their own agreement, they 
presumably will take more responsibility for it and have a stronger commitment to it over time 
(see Bacharach & Lawler 1981: chap. 6). Third parties, of course, may be critical to conflict 
resolution in many contexts, but to the degree that such parties formally or informally "force" 
agreements, the commitment of conflicting actors to the agreements should be lower and the 
need for frequent renegotiation and vigorous monitoring greater. For such reasons, a theory of 
unilateral initiatives, specifying conditions under which parties can resolve their conflict 
themselves, could form a unique niche in sociological analyses of conflict resolution processes. 
Conflict and its resolution is of long-standing interest to sociologists. Most sociological 
work adopts a structuralist approach that (1) traces the source of conflict to divergent interests of 
groups, collectivities, or classes; (2) examines the mobilization of those interests; and (3) 
implicitly attributes "solutions" of conflict to enduring power and status hierarchies that 
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distinguish groups and individuals and that are imbued with legitimacy (e.g., Dahrendorf 1959; 
Simmel 1950). Though there are certainly exceptions, sociologists have directed much less 
attention to the processes through which conflicting actors — whether they be individuals, 
groups, organizations, or societies — reach mutually agreed- upon solutions (for a few 
exceptions, see Bacharach & Lawler 1980, 1981; Blalock 1987, 1989; Kriesberg 1973; Lawler 
n.d.; Patchen 1988; Strauss 1978). Greater attention to the conflict or bargaining process does not 
necessarily require a focus on the interpersonal dynamics between negotiators (see Strauss 
1978), but it does require an analysis of the major types of moves and countermoves individuals 
or groups adopt when they bring their conflict to the bargaining table and engage in explicit 
bargaining. 
Concession behavior in explicit bargaining has symbolic import and is likely to be read 
very carefully by parties in conflict, especially since norms of explicit bargaining generally 
prevent the retraction of concessions, once given. Furthermore, it is well documented that 
concession tactics that appear too reasonable (i.e., create an impression of weakness) raise the 
aspirations and reduce the yielding of an opponent, while patterns that appear too unreasonable 
often backfire and produce resistance (Komorita & Esser 1975; Siegel & Fouraker 1960; Pruitt 
1981). Research indicates that concession tactics conveying a firm but reasonable impression are 
generally the most effective at extracting concessions from an opponent (Chertkoff & Esser 
1976; Lawler & MacMurray 1980). A commonly effective way to create such an impression is a 
very firm initial stance in the bargaining, involving little or no yielding, followed by reciprocal 
concession making. However, if both parties adopt this approach, the result is a pattern of mutual 
resistance or an impasse from which actors may not be able to extricate themselves without the 
aid of third parties. 
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The theory of unilateral initiatives offers to bargainers a straightforward response to this 
problem. Given a pattern of mutual resistance or hostility, unilateral initiatives represent a break 
with the immediate past that ostensibly mitigates the problem of distrust created by early 
interchanges (Lindskold 1978; Osgood 1962). Unilateral initiatives represent a bridge between 
mutually firm posturing in the early phase of bargaining and subsequent, mutual reciprocity. 
Retaliation tactics, in turn, help to inhibit a key form of tactical action (damage) that tends to 
interfere with conflict-resolution processes. Our theoretical formulation treats unilateral 
initiatives and retaliation tactics as primary means of producing conciliation following a period 
of mutual antagonism in explicit bargaining. 
The results of the study offer substantial support to the theory. As expected, unilateral 
initiatives produced larger concessions and fewer damage tactics than a reciprocity tactic. 
Moreover, unilateral initiatives generated the increase in trust predicted by the literature on 
Osgood's (1962) notion of GRIT; in addition, trust mediated the impact of unilateral initiatives 
on both concession making and damage tactics. Thus, as predicted, unilateral initiatives 
increased trust, which, in turn, enhanced concession making and reduced punitive action by fhe 
opponent. 
In the case of retaliation, the results offer partial support to our theoretical formulation, 
but with a few interesting twists. First, retaliation does not have the predicted effect on 
concession making of the opponent, indicating the elimination of the causal path from retaliation 
to concession magnitude in Figure 1. Second, the contrasting patterns of punitive action over 
time in the retaliation condition (i.e., a decrease) versus the no-retaliation condition (i.e., an 
increase) supports and complements our theoretical formulation. In the short term, retaliation 
behavior actually enhanced hostility (see also Gruder & Duslak 1973; Lawler, Ford & Blegen 
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1988), but, in the longer term, the costs of retaliation probably override this initial tendency 
toward hostility, especially since each party has a large punitive capability. In the no-retaliation 
condition, the use of damage tactics is lower early but grows over time, despite there being no 
direct and immediate benefit from the damage inflicted on the opponent. The most plausible 
interpretation of this result is that repeated instances of no retaliation conveyed an impression of 
weakness, leading the subject to view the opponent as more vulnerable to influence through 
punitive action. 
The final result of import concerns the combination of tactics optimal for producing 
agreements. Unilateral initiatives in conjunction with retaliation was the only combination that 
produced an agreement rate of over 50%. While agreements in experiments with programmed 
others must be interpreted cautiously, this result can be interpreted in terms of the impressions 
likely to be given off by the four tactics created by the experimental conditions. The combination 
of reciprocity (no initiative) and retaliation may make the programmed other appear too 
unreasonable in light of the initial period of hostility; the initiatives-and-no-retaliation 
combination may create an impression that is too conciliatory; and the combination of reciprocal 
concessions (no initiatives) and no retaliation may be puzzling or confusing. Combining 
unilateral initiatives with a retaliation tactic seems most likely to convey a serious interest in 
conflict resolution, in conjunction with an unwillingness to tolerate punitive action or to accept 
exploitation by the other, i.e., a firm but reasonable stance. 
This study has several general implications. First, while Lindskold and associates (1976) 
have shown how verbal expressions of intent and patterns of cooperative behavior affect 
conciliation in tacit forms of bargaining instantiated by a prisoner's dilemma setting (Linkskold 
1979; Lindskold, Bennett & Wayner 1976; Lindskold & Collins 1978; Lindskold & Finch 1981), 
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we have demonstrated the impact of a program of unilateral concessions in explicit bargaining 
(see also Hamner 1974). This program of initiatives involved somewhat greater risk of 
exploitation than some of Lindskold's (1978) practical guidelines would suggest, because it 
incorporated real concessions that cumulated over a series of bargaining interchanges (rounds). 
Second, while the success of a reciprocity strategy is well documented in research on the 
prisoner's dilemma (see Axelrod 1984; Patchen 1988), the theory of unilateral initiatives 
indicates a way to promote cooperation when a pattern of resistance and hostility is already 
established. Third, this study suggests that when a lock-in of mutual hostility occurs in explicit 
bargaining, some degree of trust — defined as an attribution- based expectation of cooperation 
— is important to generate the transformation from mutual conflict to mutual conciliation. 
To conclude, our theoretical and empirical work leads us to several hypotheses about the 
conditions important for unilateral initiatives to effectively produce conflict resolution. First, 
parties in conflict have established an explicit bargaining relationship; second, parties perceive 
each other as having approximately equal power; third, the unilateral initiatives represent a 
significant departure from a background of hostility that occurs after the onset of explicit 
bargaining; fourth, the unilateral initiatives involve small, repetitive actions that cumulate to real 
movement along a conflict issue; and, fifth, through other, independent action (e.g., retaliation) 
the party that adopts the unilateral initiatives creates an image of firmness and resolve. While 
additional conditions are likely to be important, these are basic ones that have emerged from the 
theoretical and empirical analysis. Given the potential importance of unilateral initiatives to 
conflict resolution, such tactics warrant more sustained focus and attention by sociologists. 
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Notes 
 
1. More specifically, explicit bargaining occurs where parties (1) mutually acknowledge a 
bargaining relationship, (2) perceive the conflicting issue(s) as allowing for a large range of 
possible solutions, and (3) have open lines of communication in which they make offers and 
counteroffers along an issue continuum (Bacharach & Lawler 1980:108-20). Conflict resolution, 
in this context, involves an explicit, often formal mutual agreement. Another form of bargaining, 
often termed "tacit" (Bacharach & Lawler 1980; Schelling 1960), is reflected in the efforts of 
parties to outmaneuver each other in most any conflict. In tacit baigaining, parties acknowledge a 
conflict without consenting to figuratively "sit at the bargaining table." Conflict resolution in 
such contexts takes the form of implicit coordination. 
2. When a matrix game is used as an actual laboratory research setting, the bargaining is 
tacit rather than explicit. There is no clear bargaining issue with a range of possible solutions, 
and provisional offers and counteroffers are not really possible. Only action with rewarding 
(cooperative) or punishing (competitive) consequences is available. Overall, iterative matrix 
games induce a social context similar to that which occurs when parties are in conflict but are not 
bargaining explicitly. The action of labor and management outside of contract negotiations and 
of nations in international conflict exemplifies such tacit bargaining. 
3. The meaning of the competitive choice in the prisoner's dilemma is not clear (see 
Marwell & Schmitt 1975; Nemeth 1972). It is both a noncooperative action (i.e., failure to make 
a conciliatory move) and a punishing action (i.e., damage to the other's outcomes). The 
cooperative-competitive label intertwines the positive and negative dimensions of behavior that 
are separable in explicit bargaining. Concession behavior consists of the provisional offers or 
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counteroffers along the issue continuum, and punitive behavior refers to action that damages 
resources or outcomes of the opponent that are not under direct negotiation. A decision on one 
class of action does not by definition involve a decision on the other. 
4. Conceptually, we argue that trust has two components: (1) a dispositional attribution, 
meaning an inference about the other person, e.g., trustworthiness, reasonableness; and (2) an 
application of this attribution to the others behavior in the situation, e.g., an expectation of 
cooperation. Thus, trust is essentially an expectation of cooperation based on an attribution of 
qualities to the other person. This is a modification of definitions incorporating only the 
behavioral expectations component (e.g., Pruitt 1981). 
5. Research with these experimental procedures across a number of years has typically 
yielded no or very weak results for gender (Bacharach & Lawler 1981; Lawler & Bacharach 
1987; Lawler, Ford & Blegen 1988; Lawler & MacMurray 1980). Either gender seemingly can 
be used at this point. The use of males in this study was based solely on the nature of the subject 
pool available. 
6. The results for threat tactics (warning) are generally consistent with those for damage 
tactics. An analysis of variance for the early phase (rounds 6-10) revealed an initiatives main 
effect that mirrors the findings for damage tactics [𝐹𝐹(1,76) = 11.36,𝑝𝑝 < .001, 𝑀𝑀’𝑠𝑠 = .90 vs. 1.75]. Neither retaliation nor initiatives-by-retaliation effects reached statistical significance. 
Turning to the use of threat tactics in the subsequent or later phase, the results revealed only a 
retaliation main effect, indicating fewer warnings in the retaliation condition [𝐹𝐹(1,76) = 4.13, 
𝑝𝑝 < .05]. While previous work has frequently documented minimal correspondence between 
results for threat and damage tactics (Bacharach & Lawler 1981; Lawler & Bacharach 1987; 
Lawler, Ford & Blegen 1988), this study has fairly comparable effects. 
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7. Given fairly clear theoretical expectations about how the items will cluster, setting a limit 
of two factors seems justified (see Kim & Mueller 1978). Since this procedure is open to 
question, however, we also conducted a factor analysis (varimax rotation) without any limit. The 
results are the same. Trust and predictability factors emerged with eigenvalues of 1.597 and 
1.769, respectively. The third factor had an eigenvalue of .85 and lacked a clear theoretical 
interpretation. 
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